European Warfare, 1350-1750 by European Warfare 1350-1750 (2010)

Author:European Warfare, 1350-1750 (2010)
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780511682452
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2010-03-01T00:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

The intention behind this chapter has been to sharpen the picture of post-medieval operational art by bringing into focus, however briefly, factors that are often overlooked. These include developments in the pattern of communications and mapping and, hence, in the way many commanders (and increasingly their political masters) conceptualised large-scale operations and their own ability to influence events. The development of mapping, it has been suggested, represents a key area of change in the post-medieval era, which gave commanders at all levels an essentially new operational tool. Military professionals today might well point to another very recent but equivalent step-change in this field with the development of satellite reconnaissance, location-finding, targeting, and communications systems, which have even more spectacularly transformed contemporary operations. The development of gunpowder artillery represented yet another key area of change with profound operational implications. This is, of course, well known; however it is important to understand the pace of change. If bastioned fortifications represented a strikingly effective response to improved gunpowder artillery, we also need to recognise the serious constraints on the ability of commanders to deploy the latest and most powerful gunpowder weapons in their arsenals. More than any other post-medieval weapons-system, big guns depended on a developed manufacturing base and a supporting infrastructure capable of keeping them maintained, ammunitioned, and manned by trained personnel, which included the hauliers who moved them to where they were needed. Failure in any area was critical, and although the new technology was understood, widely disseminated, and effectively utilised in sieges by the fifteenth century, only late in our period were all of the conditions satisfied regularly enough for artillery to fulfil its potential on the battlefield.

The very different conditions of low-intensity ‘small war’ have also been explored. Operations by small parties of soldiers or civilians in arms were often highly mobile and, if only occasionally decisive, were frequently conducted on a scale that called for what today would be seen as counter-insurgency operations, activities that – then as now – potentially tie down large numbers of troops and provide the classical justification for guerrilla warfare. Although relatively under-researched, ‘small war’ was a constant factor in warfare throughout the lengthy period covered by this volume.

Whether any of these factors, considered in isolation, can be placed on an equal footing with the tendency of risk-averse commanders to avoid battle or the effectiveness of post-medieval fortifications as drivers of military change is doubtful. Taken together, however, their impact on the wider conduct of operations was often highly significant.

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